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"TO DETAIN OR NOT TO DETAIN?"-
A REVIEW OF THE BACKGROUND,
CURRENT PROPOSALS, AND DEBATE
ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Sheldon Portman*
"The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of
crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of any country."
-Sir Winston Churchill
INTRODUCTION
The leading domestic issue of the 1968 presidential campaign
was that of "law and order." In response to growing public concern
over the geometric rise in the crime rate, and with the District of
Columbia reputed to be the nation's "crime capital," President
Nixon promised there would be a sharp crackdown on crime if he
were elected. In line with that pledge, within a month of his in-
auguration he submitted a twelve-point program to the Congress
for a "war on crime" in the nation's capital.'
Among the points listed in the President's program was a pro-
posal for legislation authorizing pretrial detention without bail of
accused persons considered to be "a clear danger to the commu-
nity."2 That legislation was introduced in July, 1969, in the form
of Senate Bill No. S.2600.
3
Shortly before President Nixon's announcement, Senator
Tydings of Maryland also introduced a preventive detention bill.
4
At the same time, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Committee on the Judiciary began hearings concerning
amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, particularly
with regard to "the outright detention of defendants considered to
* B.A., Kent State University, 1952; LL.B., (Case) Western Reserve University
School of Law; Member of the Ohio Bar and California Bar; Member of Criminal
Law and Procedure Committee of the California State Bar; Public Defender, Santa
Clara County; First Vice-President, California Public Defender's Association.
1 Semple, Nixon Backs Plan to Jail Suspects Held Crine-Prone, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
2 Id.
3 CONG. REc.: S. Res. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 85 (1969);
[hereinafter cited as Adm. Bill].
4 CoNo. RE:c.: S. Res. 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 672 (1969).
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represent a high risk of further criminal conduct. . . ."' These pro-
posals continue, as of this writing, to be under study in the Con-
gress. They were also the subject of debate before the American
Bar Association's Convention at Dallas in August, 1969.6
This legislation brings closer the "constitutional crisis in bail,"
predicted mid-way through the last decade by the country's leading
authority on the subject-Professor Caleb Foote.'
This article will endeavor to describe the background of the
preventive detention controversy, review the provisions of the pend-
ing legislation, and discuss the constitutional and pragmatic argu-
ments raised by both sides of the issue.'
BACKGROUND OF THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION CONCEPT-
THE MOVEMENT TO ELIMINATE MONEY BAIL
The subject of preventive detention must be discussed in the
context of activities leading to the reform of the bail system. In
reality, preventive detention is but the opposite side of the coin to
elimination of money bail-an objective which modern criminal
law reform has been steadily approaching during the past decade.
Opponents of preventive detention have argued that it is un-
precedented and foreign to our system of justice. A frequently
cited dictum in this regard is Justice Jackson's statement in Wil-
liamson v. United States,9 wherein he wrote:
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated
defenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught with dan-
ger of excess and injustice that I am loathe to resort to it....
Contrary to this view, however, it has been pointed out that
such imprisonment is actually "quite common in this and every
other civilized country.""
5 Hearings on amendments to the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 before the
Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) ; [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
6 See Report of the debate between Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson,
speaking in favor of the Administration's bill, and former U.S. Attorney General
Ramsey 'Clark in opposition. 5 CRIM. L. RPT. 2377, 2382 (1969).
7 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. I-II), 113 U. PA. L. REV.
959, 1125 (1965).
8 Numerous articles on bail reform have heretofore discussed the problem of
preventive detention. Two articles on the specific subject are: Note, Preventive
Detention, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 178 (1967); Note, Preventive Detention Before
Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1489 (1966).
9 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950).
10 A. DERSHOWITZ, On Preventive Detention, The New York Review, March 13,
1969. Professor Dershowitz quotes the following statement of a Justice of the Supreme
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The fact of the matter is that preventive detention has existed
in a sub rosa form in the common practice of setting extremely high
money bail for persons thought to constitute a danger regardless
of a lack of evidence indicating a likelihood of flight." Frequently,
such defendants demonstrated by their lengthy past records that
they are not "bail jumpers." This practice is not only vulnerable
on eighth amendment grounds as being excessive, it also violates
the equal protection clause because it affects only the poor, whereas
defendants with money, such as professional gangsters and rack-
eteeers, who are often more dangerous to society, have very little
difficulty posting high bail.'2
With the trend toward eliminating money bail manifested by
the enactment of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 and the
recently approved ABA Standards on Pretrial Release," the con-
troversy over preventive detention is necessarily brought to the
surface and must now be met headon. Bail reform and increasing
court delays in the District of Columbia have resulted in many
more defendants awaiting their trials out of custody for longer
periods of time. As one writer has pointed out:
This had led to an increase--or at least the appearance of an increase
-in the number of crimes committed by some of these defendants be-
tween arrest and trial. And so, in an effort to stem this tide of increas-
ing crime, many political leaders, including senators as diverse in their
political views as Roman Hruska and Joseph Tydings, have focused
their attention on the defendant awaiting trial. The slogan "crime in
the streets" has found its first political victim.14
To assess the preventive detention concept, the forces which
have motivated bail reform in the United States must first be
examined.
Studies Documenting the Inequities of the Bail System
The first modern survey of the operation of the bail system
was conducted in Chicago, Illinois, in 1927 by Professor Arthur
Court of Burma as being closer to the truth: ". . .preventive justice which consists
in restraining a man from committing a crime which he may commit but has not yet
committed .. . is common to all systems of jurisprudence." (Maung Hla Gyaw v.
Commissioner, 1948 Burma Law Reps. 764, 766).
11 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1965) at 29; ABA PROJECT ON MIN-
IMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating To Pretrial Release,
Approved Draft (1968) at 6 [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
12 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE; D. J. FREED & P. M. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES (1964), at 49-50,
94-60.
13 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at § 5.4.
14 A. DERsHowrrz, supra note 10.
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Lawton Beeley.15 An examination of court records and case his-
tories of several hundred prisoners awaiting trial showed that 90
percent of the entire unsentenced jail population had lived in Chi-
cago over one year, 70 percent had families there, and one-half
had references from reputable persons. It was also discovered that
one-half of the prisoners had no record of prior convictions. Bail
settings were being made in most instances on the basis of an arbi-
trary schedule according to the alleged offense without regard to the
individual's personal circumstances, and accordingly, many persons
were being detained unnecessarily. As a result of this study, Pro-
fessor Beeley recommended the practice of a fact-finding investiga-
tion in each case in order to fix bail according to individual cir-
cumstances. He was more than thirty years ahead of his time,
however, and nothing was done nor was any other major bail study
conducted until 1954 when a group of University of Pennsylvania
law students under the direction of Professor Caleb Foote made
a study of the bail system in Philadelphia."6 This study showed that
three out of four defendants charged with serious crimes ended up
staying in jail between time of arrest and time of trial. A survey
of 1,000 jail cases revealed that 528 of these persons were later
released after trial and had spent an average of 33 days in jail.
Use of high bail for preventive detention purposes and to "make
an example" of certain defendants was frankly admitted by some
magistrates. The students also found that the county prison in
Philadelphia was chronically over-crowded and furthermore, that
the cost for pretrial detentions was $300,000 per year.
A similar study was conducted in New York City in 1957 by
another group of researchers under Professor Foote's direction .
7
In this study it was found that the nature of the charged offense
was generally the factor most relied upon to set bail with only an
occasional reference to defendant's background or the likelihood
of his non-appearance. Eighty-eight percent of the prisoners inter-
viewed had local relatives and 55 percent had resided in the city
for more than 10 years. Pretrial detention facilities cost the City
of New York $5 million in 1955 with prisoners awaiting trial con-
fined for 18 hours a day under restraints which were comparable
to maximum security penal institutions. No work and few recre-
ational opportunities were provided for them.' 8
15 A. L. Barzy, THE BAiL SYsTEM IN CHICAGO (1927).
16 Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1954).
. 17 Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 693 (1958).
18 Kaufman, Detention Centers 60% Over Capacity, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22,
1970, at 39, col. 1.
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A study of the operation of the bail system in another large
metropolitan area was conducted in 1962 by the District of Colum-
bia Bar Association's Junior Bar Section. 9 Sixty-six percent of the
defendants studied were unable to post bail. Seventeen percent of
those who had bail set at $500 remained in custody, while 40 per-
cent failed at $1,000, and 78 percent failed at $2,500.
A comparison of final dispositions by the District of Columbia
study revealed that 25 percent of those able to obtain their release
by posting bail received probationary or suspended sentences
whereas only 6 percent of those who could not afford bail received
probationary sentences. Bail setting procedures were also analyzed.
This comparison showed that magistrates invariably based their
decisions on the prosecutor's recommendations, which were based
on defendant's prior record and the nature of the offense, with
little or no regard to family ties or length of residence, property
ownership, or record on probation. Bondsmen, on the other hand,
gave great weight to the latter items.
Defense attorneys who were interviewed during the course
of the survey gave the opinion that pretrial detention made trial
preparation very difficult and had a further detrimental effect on
the outcome of their cases due to the accused's inability to locate
witnesses, the pressure of incarceration on jury waivers to secure
an early trial, and the adverse effect on the jury of observing a
defendant enter the courtroom from the cell block.
The District of Columbia study also showed that pretrial de-
tainees constituted 30 to 40 percent of the total jail population
with an average custody period of 51 days at a cost of $200 per
defendant. The total cost of such incarcerations in 1962 was
$500,000.
In 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy appointed a spe-
cial committee to study and report on bail practices in the Federal
Courts." This study confirmed what the others had shown-that
bail for indigents was being set without regard to individual circum-
stances and was generally based upon the charge and the cir-
cumstances of the offense. A survey of four districts showed a wide
variance in the proportion of persons remaining in pretrial deten-
tion. In the District of Connecticut, 23 percent of the defendants
were unable to make bail; 33 percent in the North District of
Illinois; 58 percent in the Northern District of California (San
19 JR. BAR SEC., D.C. BAR Ass'N (1963), The Bail System of the District of
Columbia.
20 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT Ou THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COm-
MITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963).
[Vol. 10
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Francisco), and 83 percent in the Eastern District of California
(Sacramento). It was also learned that those free on bail were
more often acquitted or had their charges dismissed whereas those
in custody pleaded guilty more frequently. The Attorney General's
report concluded that the bail procedure in the Federal system
results in "serious problems for defendants of limited means, im-
perils the effective operation of the adversary system, and may
even fail to provide the most effective deterrents of non-appearance
by accused persons."12
1
The Attorney General's committee recommended that there
be increased reliance upon summons, institution of a bail investiga-
tive function as part of the Federal Probation Service, a policy
by the Justice Department favoring pretrial release, greater re-
liance on release on personal recognizance, use of non-monetary
conditions, and authorization for posting of cash less than the
bail amount, refundable upon the defendant's appearance.
As a result of these studies and recommendations, several im-
portant innovations in the bail system occurred during the sixties.
Innovations and Efforts to Improve the Bail System
1. The Manhattan Bail Project and the Vera Foundation.
Although the above studies were conducted by lawyers, law pro-
fessors and law students, the first modern change in the system
was brought about by a non-lawyer. In 1960, a chemical engineer
and industrialist named Louis Schweitzer was taken on a tour of a
Brooklyn detention prison. He was so shocked and indignant at
what he saw that he immediately took steps to determine what
he could do to change the system.
Schweitzer was particularly struck by the fact that some
people were held in pretrial detention for as long as a year because
they could not afford bail. Young male defendants, aged 16 to 20,
were being thrown into prison with hardened criminals. Facilities
were worse than those for prisoners who had been convicted and were
serving their sentences in state prisons. He was also distressed
over the economic discrimination of the system which in 1960 re-
sulted in nearly 115,000 people being held in custody before trial
in New York City. Over 80,000 of these defendants were acquitted
or had their charges dismissed but were required to remain in
prison for no other reason than that they were poor and could not
afford bail.22
21 Id.
22 R. GoLDFARB, RANSOM 150-51 (1965). See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The
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This experience caused Mr. Schweitzer to establish the Vera
Foundation (named after his mother) to promote equal protection
of the laws, aid the indigent accused, and develop programs to
further "law, justice, and civil liberties in the United States.123
The first Vera program was the Manhattan Bail Project which
began in October, 1961, in cooperation with the New York Univer-
sity Law School and its Institute of Judicial Administration.
Herbert J. Sturz was appointed Executive Director of the
Vera Foundation and also served as Director of the Manhattan
Bail Project. The start of the program was difficult and uncertain,
as described by Mr. Sturz:
Months of study preceded our first day in court. Our early thought
was to provide a revolving bail fund which would be available to in-
digent defendants. But helping the poor to buy their freedom is no
solution; it merely perpetuates reliance upon money as the criterion
for release. We wanted to break the pattern and stimulate a more
basic change in bail thinking. The release of greater numbers on their
own recognizance appeared the broadest and most potentially valuable
approach. We decided to test the hypothesis that a greater number of
defendants could be successfully released in this way if verified infor-
mation about their stability and community roots could be presented
to the court. This was the goal of Vera Foundation's first undertaking:
The Manhattan Bail Project.24
The bail project was financed in part by a grant from the
Ford Foundation and had the assistance of a student working force
from the New York University Law School. The project procedure
was as follows: When prisoners were brought to the court holding
area prior to first appearance, law students checked their previous
records and current charges. If eligible (depending upon established
criteria),25 prisoners were interviewed to determine whether they
had community ties. Questions were asked about their job situa-
tions, length of employment, local family ties and family support,
receipt of unemployment insurance or welfare relief. After the inter-
views, the students scored the defendants according to a point weigh-
Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.
L.. REv. 67 (1963).
23 R. GOLDFARB, supra note 22, at 152.
24 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964) at 43 [hereinafter cited as
NATIONAL BAIL CONFERENCE].
25 The initial guidelines were that the defendants charged with homicide, felonious
assault on a police officer, forcible rape, impairing the morals of a minor, carnal abuse,
and narcotics offenses, were automatically excluded from consideration along with all
non-indigent defendants. Toward the end of its first three years of operation, the class
of excluded offenses was substantially narrowed so that only defendants charged with
homicide and certain narcotics offenses were ineligible. Another change was that both
indigent and non-indigent defendants were considered.
[Vol. 10
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ing system. If a particular prisoner was considered a good "O.R."
(own recognizance) risk, the interviewer obtained his written con-
sent to allow the interviewer to contact a friend, relative or em-
ployer in order to verify the information. The verification was done
either by phone or in the visitors' section of the courtroom. The
interview generally lasted about 10 minutes and the verification
less than an hour. After completing the verification, if the defen-
dant was considered a good risk, a summary of the information was
sent to the arraignment court. The judge, the district attorney and
defense counsel received copies of the recommendation and sup-
porting information. 26
During the first year of the project, a separate control group
constituting half of the recommendable cases was studied. This was
done in order to demonstrate how accused persons who met "good
risk" criteria fared without the Vera recommendation. It was found
that the courts granted "O.R." releases in 60 percent of the cases
in which a recommendation was made; but in the parallel control
group cases, only 14 percent were released. Thus, it was shown
that four times as many accused persons were being released by the
courts as a result of the verified information.
During three years of operation, 3,505 accused persons were re-
leased on their own recognizance as a result of recommendations
made by the Manhattan Bail Project. Of this number, 98.4 percent
returned to court when required; 1.6 percent, or 56 persons, wilfully
failed to appear compared to a 3 percent forfeiture rate on bail
bonds during the same period.
As of April, 1965, 3,202 of the persons released through the
project had their cases finally disposed of in the courts. Of these,
48 percent were acquitted or had their cases dismissed. Seventy
percent of those found guilty received suspended sentences, while
10 percent were given prison terms. The remaining 20 percent
received alternative fines or -jail sentences.28
2. National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice. As a re-
sult of this extremely successful experiment, the Manhattan Bail
Project concept spread rapidly throughout the United States. In
May of 1964, the Vera Foundation and the Justice Department
co-sponsored the first National Conference on Bail and Criminal
Justice, attended by more than 400 judges,. prosecutors, defense
lawyers, police, bondsmen and prison officials. During the Confer-
ence, they analyzed and discussed alternatives to monetary bail
26 NATIONAL BAIL CoNPERENCE, supra note 24, at 44.
27 Id. at 45.
28 Id. at xxii.
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based on the experience of the Manhattan Bail Project and the
other programs which followed in its wake. 9 As a result of the
Conference, tremendous impetus was given to the spread of the
bail reform movement over the entire United States.8"
The federal system was also affected due to the involvement
of Attorney General Robert Kennedy in the activities of the Con-
ference. A district-by-district study of pretrial release practices
was instituted, aimed at minimizing pretrial detention wherever
possible. In addition, extensive hearings were conducted in the
Eighty-eighth Congress by two Senate Judiciary Subcommittees on
legislation to allow for the release of indigents on personal recog-
nizance. This activity culminated in enactment of the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1966.31
3. Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. The Bail Reform Act of
19662 was adopted by a nearly unanimous Congress and consti-
tuted the first major overhaul of federal bail law since 1789, when
the First Congress adopted the eighth amendment, barring exces-
sive bail, and enacted the Federal Judiciary Act, providing the right
to bail in non-capital cases. The stated purpose of the Reform Act
was "to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all per-
sons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be
detained pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify,
or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of jus-
tice nor the public interest."3
The Bail Reform Act went beyond the experience of the
projects which had inspired it. First, it created a presumption of
the right to release without payment of money before trial; thus,
release without money bail was to become the norm, not the excep-
tion. The system was designed to shift the emphasis from release
29 Id. at xiv. Of particular relevance to this article's main subject was the state-
ment in the Interim Report of the Conference which pointed out that "the most
perplexing of all problems raised at and since the conference is the issue of so-called
preventive detention, i.e., the intentional setting of bail beyond the means of a de-
fendant believed to be dangerous for the purpose of assuring that he will not be re-
leased prior to trial." The conference report criticized this practice as follows:
"Because high bail setting at the trial level is hardly ever accompanied by a judicial
opinion or a statement of reasons, and is rarely the subject of appellate review, the
practice at present is largely unseen. The defendant simply fails to raise the bond pre-
mium and remains in jail. No standards are currently described by rule or statute for
authorized pretrial detention, except in capital cases. A substantial body of opinion
supports the view that setting high bail to detain dangerous offenders is unconsti-
tutional." NATIONAL BAIL CoNFEREN CE, supra note 24, at xxix.
30 Id. at xv-xx.
31 Id. at xx-xxi.
82 Act of June 22, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465 amending 18 U.S.C. 3146 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1966)).
33 Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2 (June 22, 1966).
[Vol. 10
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of specially qualified defendants on personal recognizance to re-
lease of all defendants on conditions tailored to their individual
risks. If a defendant could not obtain his release, a clear statement
of reasons for imposing conditions which he could not meet was
required on which to base further review.
Among the various conditions, in addition to or in lieu of
personal bond, which the Act allowed were the following: (1) plac-
ing the person in custody of a designated person or organization;
(2) restricting his travel, association, or place of abode; (3) re-
quiring execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount
with a deposit of cash or other security not exceeding 10 percent
of the amount of the bond with the deposit to be returned upon the
performance of the conditions of release; (4) requiring execution
of a bail bond or deposit of cash in lieu thereof; (5) imposing any
other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appear-
ance as required, including the requirement that the person return
to custody after specified hours.3 4
In determining the conditions of release, the Act requires that
the judicial officer consider the "available information, tak[ing]
into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused's family
ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condi-
tion, the length of his residence in the community, his record of
convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or
of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court pro-
ceedings. 3 5
If the defendant cannot obtain his release under the stated
conditions, after 24 hours he may apply to the judicial officer who
imposed the conditions for a review. Unless the conditions are
amended and the person released, the judicial officer must set forth,
in writing, the reasons for requiring the stated conditions. 6 Ex-
pedited court review and the right of appeal are also provided by
the Act.3 7 The same provisions are applicable in capital and post-
conviction cases unless the court has "reason to believe that no
one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the
person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the
community."3 8
Except with respect to persons released pending appeal, no
34 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a).
35 Id. § 3146(b).
36 Id. § 3146(d).
37 Id. § 3147.
38 Id. § 3148.
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provision was made for detention of defendants considered danger-
ous or likely to commit future crimes. In this regard, the report
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (submitted to the Con-
gress at the time that the bill [S.1357] was first reported out)
stated the following:
The bill is not intended to deal with the problem of preventive deten-
tion of an accused because of the possibility that his liberty might en-
danger the public welfare, either because of the accused's predisposi-
tion to commit further acts of violence during the pretrial period, or
because of the likelihood that his freedom might result in the intimi-
dation of witnesses or the destruction of evidence. While it is recog-
nized that the preventive detention problem is intimately related to
the bail reform problem, the committee feels that the need for reform
of existing bail procedures is so pressing that such reforms should not
be delayed with the hope of enacting more comprehensive legislation
that might deal also with the preventive detention problem. Conse-
quently the present bill deals only with the bail reform problem reserv-
ing the preventive detention problem for additional study.
3 9
Two-and-one-half years later, on January 21, 1969, the subject
of preventive detention amendments to the Bail Reform Act was
taken up by the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. In
calling the first meeting to order, the Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee, Senator Sam Ervin, stated:
One major problem [in the application of the Bail Reform Act] is that
the provisions of the Act which restrict the imposition of money bail
and which require any pretrial detention be justified in writing by the
judicial officer as necessary to prevent flight to avoid prosecution have
resulted in the release of many allegedly dangerous defendants who
previously could have been detained extra-legally by setting high
money bail. This has led many persons to suggest that the Act be
amended to authorize expressly the outright detention of defendants
considered to represent a high risk of further criminal conduct, as well
as those considered to represent a high risk of flight.
40
One year after the Bail Reform Act was signed into law, a
Justice Department study of its effectiveness was undertaken.
4
'
This study showed that the Act was not completely fulfilling its
objectives. Out of 479 jail inmates who were interviewed, 458 were
found to be technically eligible for pretrial release. Two hundred
and thirteen of the eligibles were interviewed intensively. The
information received from 90 percent of these prisoners was verified
by the researchers; nevertheless, they remained in custody. Fur-
89 S. REP. No. 780, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Quoted in Senate Hearings,
supra note 5, at 435.
40 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 1.
41 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE; J. S. REYNOLDS & W. A. FITCH, THE BAIL REFORM ACT
AND PRETRIAL DETENTION (1967).
[Vol. 10
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thermore, of the sample group which had been verified, only 19, or9 percent, had been recommended for release by the District ofColumbia Bail Agency, which was responsible for carrying out theinvestigative functions necessary to assist the courts. The research-
ers also found that "[i]t is an 'open secret' that judges consider a
defendant's 'dangerousness' in setting bail."42
Although the administration of the Act was not completely
successful, nevertheless, after the Act took effect over 40 percent
of the defendants in the District Court for the District of Columbia
were released without money bail, whereas the number of persons
so released before was infinitesimal. 3 Statistics reported by thePresident's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia
showed that in 1950 only 0.7 percent obtained their release onpersonal bond or recognizance; in 1955, 1.4 percent did so; in1960, 3.3 percent did; and in 1965, 9.8 percent obtained their re-
lease in this way.4
During its hearings in early 1969, the Senate Subcommittee
received numerous suggestions for improving the administration
of the Act. These included recommendations for expansion and in-
creased funding of the Bail Agency for more rapid collection of
verified information, and to allow for supervision of release condi-
tions and for providing adequate advance notice of court appear-
ances to defendants. 5
A Judicial Council Committee of the District of Columbia also
recommended steps designed to minimize danger to the public, such
as release conditions to inhibit crime, strict supervision of release
conditions by the Agency, and expedited trials for defendants
charged with crimes of violence and for those who had violated
their conditions of release or had been indicted for a felony during
the period of their release.4 6 A recommendation was also made for
consecutive sentences for persons convicted of additional crimes
while on release.
Specific recommendations were made regarding the kinds of
conditions which could be imposed if the Act were amended to
authorize consideration of a defendant's potential danger .4 Theseincluded such things as requiring the defendant to reside at a spe-
42 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 650.
43 Id. at 127, 552, 595, 694.
44 Id. at 595.
45 Id. at 6: Testimony of Hon. Geo. L. Hart, Judge, U.S. District Court, Chair-
man of D.C. Judicial Council Committee on the Bail Reform Act.4 6 Id.




cified place and to obtain permission to change his residence; re-
quiring him to be employed at a particular job and to obtain prior
approval to change it; prohibiting absence from his residence or
employment for a period of more than one or two hours without
prior authority; imposing a nighttime curfew; prohibiting associa-
tion with certain persons or groups; periodic reporting to the
bail agency and the probation department; deducting a portion of
earnings to deposit with the Agency as security for appearance;
and other restrictions appropriate to particular circumstances.
4 8
Related to the problem of preventive detention was the inci-
dence of crime committed pending bail. The District of Columbia
District Court statistics for 1968 show that there were 153 persons
re-arrested among a total of 1,540 released pending trial-10 per-
cent of the total.49 One thousand and seventeen persons were re-
leased without money bail, and 96 (9.4 percent) were re-indicted,
compared to 57 re-indictments (10.9 percent) of 523 persons out
on money bail.5"
The recidivism rate for persons out of custody in the District
of Columbia was 8.8 percent in 1967 and 7.5 percent in 1966.
11
The District of Columbia Crime Commission statistics for the
period 1963-65 show a re-indictment rate for released persons of
7.46 percent. 2
4. American Bar Association's Advisory Committee Recom-
mendations on Pretrial Release Standards. The subject of bail re-
form was studied by the American Bar Association's Advisory
Committee on Pretrial Proceedings for 3 years. The Committee's
recommendations were approved in August, 1968, by the ABA
House of Delegates. 8 These proposals involve reforms based on
the data of earlier studies and the experience of the Manhattan
Bail Project.
In making these recommendations, the Committee listed the
numerous inequities of the present system, including the following:
48 Id. at 33. Judge Greene also suggested that the Bail Agency be provided with
sufficient personnel for "meaningful supervision, investigation and inspection;" that
penalties for offenses committed while on bail be increased; that greater efforts be
made to apprehend and punish "bail jumpers;" and that trials be expedited by ap-
pointment of sufficient numbers of judges, prosecutors and other supporting personnel.
49 Id. at 696.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 554, 591.
52 Id. at 601. These statistics show a 33.3 percent increase of post-Act over
pre-Act recidivism (7.5 percent to 10 percent) whereas there was an 18 percent in-
crease in crime as reflected by the increase in the number of criminal cases in the
District Court during the same period (1,603 in 1965 to 1,892 in 1968). (See tables
shown at 596, 687.)
63 ABA STANDARws, supra note 11.
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(1) that it inevitably discriminates against the poor; (2) that bail
is generally set at the time of a defendant's first appearance when
counsel has usually not entered the picture, with no particular
effort to develop the facts bearing on the question of bail and with-
out any systematic attempt to relate the decision to the individual
condition and background of a particular defendant; (3) that grave
consequences result from unnecessary pretrial detention' by subject-
ing those who are presumed to be innocent to psychological and
physical conditions which are more onerous than what is imposed
upon convicted defendants, together with loss of employment, in-
ability to assist in preparing one's defense, and the infliction of
severe hardship on innocent family members; (4) that such de-
fendants suffer convictions more frequently than those who are on
bail, and are more likely to receive a jail sentence rather than pro-
bation; and (5) that unnecessary detention results in tremendous
costs to the public in maintaining prisoners in custody as well as
for welfare payments to their families. 4
In order to overcome these deficiencies, the Standards are
aimed at minimizing pretrial custody. 5 Thus, it is provided that
police officers be encouraged and in some cases required to issue
citations in lieu of making an arrest when acting without a warrant. 56
In regard to the issuance of arrest warrants by judicial officers,
they should be given authority to issue a summons rather than an
arrest warrant, and should issue a warrant only when reasonable
cause exists to believe the defendant will flee or will fail to respond.57
A summons should be mandatory whenever the penalty for the of-
fense is less than six months' imprisonment. 8
At the first court appearance, a defendant should be released
"O.R." without any special inquiry if the case involves an offense
subject to less than one year's imprisonment; an exception to this
is provided if the prosecution gives notice of intent to oppose the
release.59 For charges involving a maximum exceeding one year, a
"pre-first appearance inquiry" is recommended.6° This consists of
an investigation by an independent agency or by an arm of the
court."'
As for the release decision itself, the Standards recommend a
presumption that a defendant is entitled to an "O.R." release unless
54 Id. at 1-3.
55 Id. § 1.1.
56 Id. §§ 2.1-2.5.
57 Id. §§ 3.1, 3.3.
58 Id. § 3.2.
59 Id. § 4.4.
60 Id. § 4.5.
61 Id. § 4.5(b).
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there is a finding of substantial risk of non-appearance or if special
circumstances require the imposition of conditions.6 2 If the court
decides that an "O.R." release is not warranted, the reasons for
that decision must be stated.63
The ABA Standards set forth the kinds of specific conditions
that may be imposed for conditional releases. These include such
things as releasing the defendant into the care of a qualified person
or organization; placing him under the supervision of a probation
officer or other official; imposing reasonable restrictions on his
activities, movements, associations and residences; and releasing
him during working hours but requiring a return to custody at
specified times. 4
When there are no other conditions of release which will rea-
sonably assure the defendant's appearance, only then should the
court impose money bail-preferably a deposit of an amount of
cash equal to 10 percent of the face of the bond."5 A specific pro-
hibition is recommended against the use of money bail "to punish
or frighten the defendant, to placate public opinion or to prevent
anticipated criminal conduct."6 The most far-reaching provision
is that which prohibits compensated sureties.
6 7
The most difficult problem confronting the ABA Committee
was that of preventive detention. The operation of such detention
under the present system was described as follows:
[I]t is no secret that many judges, when faced with a defendant whom
they fear will commit "additional crimes" if released, feel compelled
to set bail beyond his reach. In effect, bail is used to deny rather than
to facilitate pretrial release. While the practice is pervasive, it is also
generally regarded as a distortion of the'bail system. Moreover, in the
cases of some defendants highly likely to continue their depredations,
the organized criminals, the judge's attempt to protect the public is
often thwarted simply because the defendant's "organization" has ample
resources with which to meet high bail. Beyond this fact, it has seemed
to the Advisory Committee that only confusion and dissatisfaction can
result from attempting to twist the bail system in order to prevent
crime. So-called preventive detention should be dealt with openly and
on its own merits, not masked by manipulations of bail amounts.
6 8
After considerable debate, the ABA Committee delayed recom-
mending outright preventive detention but did propose new methods
62 Id. § 5.1.
63 Id. § 5.1(d).
64 Id. § 5.2.
65 Id. § 5.3.
60 Id. § 5.3(b).
67 Id. § 5.4.
08 Id. at 6.
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for meeting the problem. These included release revocations for
violation of conditions or after indictment, or a holding order for a
subsequent felony. 9
This background on the bail reform movement provides the
necessary perspective for the following examination of the pending
legislation and debate on preventive detention.
THE LEGISLATION AND DEBATE ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Proposed Legislation
1. The Administration's Bill.70 The Nixon Administration has
proposed amendments to the Bail Reform Act to allow pretrial de-
tention of persons charged with "a dangerous crime" ;7 1 for a "crime
of violence" while on bail or parole for another such crime or if
convicted before within a 10-year period; 72 for an offense involving
the obstruction of justice, such as threatening or harming witnesses
or jurors.7 ' Authority is also allowed to detain persons charged with
crimes of violence who are found to be narcotics addicts. 4
The procedural requirements are that a judicial officer must
conduct a hearing and find by "clear and convincing evidence" that
the defendant comes within one of the proscriptive categories. It
must also be found that no release condition or combination of
conditions would "reasonably assure the safety of any other per-
sons or the community," and that there is "a substantial probability"
that the person is guilty of the charged offense. 5 If the defendant is
ordered detained, written findings of fact and reasons for the order
are required.
The above procedures are initiated and carried out as follows:
If a defendant is already before the court, the United States At-
torney may make an oral motion for detention. In other cases, he
may file an ex parte written motion, and an arrest warrant may be
69 Id. §§ 5.6-5.8.
70 Adm. Bill, supra note 3. For an excellent discussion of President Nixon's
proposal amending the Bail Reform Act of 1966, see Mitchell, Bail Reform and the
Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1969).
71 A "dangerous crime" is defined in Section 7 of the bill as robbery, burglary,
arson, rape, lewd conduct with a child, and sale or distribution of drugs.72 A "crime of violence" is defined in Section 7 as murder, rape, carnal knowl-
edge of a female under the age of 16, lewd conduct with a child, mayhem, kidnapping,
robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter, extortion, blackmail with threats of vi-
olence, arson, assault with intent to commit any offense, assault with a dangerous
weapon, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit these crimes.
73 Adm. Bill, supra note 3, §§ 2, 3146A(a) (3).
74 Id. § 3146B.
75 Id. § 3146A(c).
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issued followed by the detention proceedings. The detention hearing
must be held "immediately" when the defendant is brought before
the judicial officer unless a request for a continuance is made, in
which case the hearing may be delayed for not more than five calen-
dar days on motion of the defendant, or not more than three days, at
the request of the prosecution. 76 At the hearing, the defendant is en-
titled to counsel, to present "information," to testify, and to present
and to cross-examine witnesses. The "information" offered need not
conform to the rules for the admissibility of evidence, and defen-
dant's testimony at the hearing is not admissible later on the issue
of guilt except that it may be used in prosecutions for failure to
appear, for crimes committed while on release, for contempt of
court in violating release conditions, for perjury prosecution or for
impeachment in any subsequent proceedings. 77 Appellate review
of detention orders is allowed as in appeals from conditions for
releases.78
Persons detained under the new provisions would receive "an
expedited trial," and would be entitled to release after 60 days
unless the trial had begun in the meantime or a delay had been
requested by the defendant.
79
The bill also provides for additional penalties for crimes com-
mitted while on release pending trial.8" One to five years of addi-
tional and consecutive imprisonment is required for a felony con-
viction, and 90 days to one year for a misdemeanor offense. Viola-
tions of release conditions may also be penalized by revocation of re-
lease and detention and by prosecution for contempt of court.
81
2. The Tydings and Byrd Bills. Both Senator Joseph D.
Tydings of Maryland, and Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Vir-
ginia introduced preventive detention legislation during the first
session of the Ninety-first Congress.82
Senator Byrd proposed a broadly drawn amendment which
would allow the court to consider "danger to other persons or the
community" in determining release conditions.
83 He also proposed
the outright denial of bail for persons charged with a crime of
violence who have previously been convicted of such 
an offense. 84
76 Id. § 3146A(c) (3).
77 Id. § 3146A(c) (6).
78 Id. § 3146A(c) (7).
79 Id. § 3146A(d).
80 Id. §§ 6, 3150A.
81 Id. § 3150B.
82 Both bills are reproduced in Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 483, 486 and
492.
83 S. 288, cited in Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 486.
84 S. 299, cited in Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 489.
[Vol. i0
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
The Tydings bill would allow pretrial detention for a period
not exceeding 30 days after an evidentiary hearing in certain speci-
fied cases. Such hearings would be required on application of the
Government in three situations: (1) if the defendant, while on
release pending trial or appeal on a felony, has been charged either
with a felony involving serious bodily harm or with the threat of
such conduct; or (2) if he has been charged with such an offense
or threat and the prosecution alleges by affidavit that the defendant,
if released, will inflict serious bodily harm on another, or because
of a prior pattern of behavior, constitutes "a substantial danger
to other persons or to the community;" or (3) if the charge is
armed robbery.85
The hearing must occur within two days. All "relevant evidence
and testimony" may be received and the defendant is entitled to
counsel and to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses; his
testimony may not be considered at any other judicial proceeding
nor does it constitute a waiver of his privilege against self-incrim-
ination.86 If there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the de-
fendant will intimidate witnesses, unlawfully interfere with the
administration of justice, cause the death of or serious bodily
harm to another, or take part in an armed robbery, the judicial
officer is authorized to impose appropriate conditions of release.
But if these are not adequate to provide "the necessary protection,"
pretrial commitment is required for not more than 30 days. 7 A
statement of reasons for the court's order is required; the right
of appeal is allowed; and the case must be placed on an "expedited
trial calendar. 88
In a companion bill, Senator Tydings has also proposed two
important additional innovations.89 One would allow the Bail Re-
form Act to be applied to a person charged with a capital offense
when the court believes that he would not flee or pose a danger to
others.90 Another feature of the same bill is a change which would
deny a release while awaiting sentence or appeal unless the court
believes that the defendant is not likely to flee, pose a danger, or
commit other offenses, and that his appeal is not frivolous.9'
The Debate
1. The Constitutional Issue. There are two basic facets to the
constitutional issue on preventive detention. The first is whether
85 S. 546, § 3146A(a), cited in Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 492-93.
*86 Id. § 3146A(c) (d) at 494.
87 Id. § 3146A(c) at 494-95.
88 Id. § 3146A(d) (g) at 495.
89 S. 547, cited in Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 497.
90 Id. § 3148(a) at 497.
91 Id. § 3148(b) at 498.
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such detention violates the bail provision of the eighth amendment
of the Federal Constitution, and the second is whether it is contrary
to the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The eighth amendment issue is somewhat confused by the
language of the bail clause which prohibits "excessive bail." 2 A
literal interpretation indicates the amendment merely relates to the
amount of bail when bail is set. However, it has been argued, on the
basis of a historical analysis, that the clause must be interpreted
broadly to mean that a right to bail exists in virtually all casesY3
The case most often cited by the proponents of a narrow inter-
pretation of the clause is Carlson v. Landon. 4 In a five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court upheld a denial of bail to alien Com-
munists pending deportation proceedings. This ruling was based
on the view that deportations were "civil proceedings" to which the
eighth amendment did not apply. In dictum, the majority observed
that the bail clause had been taken from the English Bill of Rights
Act, which had never been interpreted to allow the right to bail in
all cases but only to prohibit excessive bail in those cases where
it was proper. It was further noted that the eighth amendment
had not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in
which bail should be allowed; thus, in capital cases it was not com-
pulsory."' Other decisions which have followed the Carlson inter-
pretation are Mastrian v. Hedman,96 People v. Keeper of City
Prisons,97 and Vandford v. Brand."
Opposed to the view of the majority in Carlson was the dissent
of Mr. Justice Black, who forcefully argued that the majority's
interpretation would nullify the eighth amendment protection since
it meant that the basic right to be implemented by the bail provision
could be restricted out of existence by the legislature, and that it
was a contradiction to say on the one hand that the eighth amend-
ment prohibits denial of release by excessive bail but leaves open
the possibility of legislative emasculation of the right.9
92 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Amendment provides in its entirety: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."
93 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959,
989 (1965).
94 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
95 Id. at 345-46.
96 326 F.2d 708, 710-11 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
97 290 N.Y. 393, 49 N.E.2d 498, 39 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1943).
98 126 Ga. 67, 54 S.E. 822 (1906).
99 In a stinging criticism of the majority's view, Justice Black stated: "Under
this contention, the Eighth Amendment is a limitation upon judges only, for while
a judge cannot constitutionally fix excessive bail, Congress can direct that people be
held in jail without any right to bail at all. Stated still another way, the Amendment
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The reliance on English precedent by the majority in Carlson
v. Landon and by advocates of pretrial detention'"° has been crit-
icized by Professor Caleb Foote as "substantially irrelevant be-
cause it is perfectly clear from colonial and early American history
that major deviations were made from English practices, that early
American practice in regard to pretrial liberty in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries was in effect a repudiation of the restric-
tions of then existing British bail law.'' 1°1
Professor Foote has also criticized "laudatory references" to
continental European pretrial procedures, citing his own personal
experiences in Rome during the Summer of 1966:
I sat for two days in the office of the Chief Magistrate . . . of the
criminal courts of the City of Rome in Italy, and I went over with him
case after case of the folders that were on his desk. I was there
does no more than protect a right to bail which Congress can grant and which Con-
gress can take away. The Amendment is thus reduced below the level of a pious
admonition. Maybe the literal language of the framers lends itself to this weird, de-
vitalizing interpretation when scrutinized with a hostile eye. But at least until recently,
it has been the judicial practice to give a broad, liberal interpretation to those pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights obviously designed to protect the individual from
governmental oppression. I would follow that practice here. The Court refuses to
do so because (1) the English Bill of Rights 'has never been thought to accord a
right to bail in all cases . . .' and (2) 'in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where
the punishment may be death.' As to (1): The Eighth Amendment is in the American
Bill of Rights of 1789, not the English Bill of Rights of 1689. And it is well known
that our Bill of Rights was written and adopted to guarantee Americans greater
freedom than had been enjoyed by their ancestors who had been driven from Europe
by persecution. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264-265. As to (2): It is true
bail has frequently been denied in this country 'when the punishment may be death.'
I fail to see where the Court's analogy between deportation and the death penalty
advances its argument unless it is also analogizing the offense of indoctrinating talk to
the crime of first degree murder .... Prior to this Amendment's adoption, history had
been filled with instances where individuals had been imprisoned and held for want
of bail on charges that could not be substantiated. Official malice had too frequently
been the cause of imprisonment. The plain purpose of our bail Amendment was to
make it impossible for any agency of Government, even the Congress, to authorize
keeping people imprisoned a moment longer than was necessary to assure their attend-
ance to answer whatever legal burden or obligation might thereafter be validly
imposed upon them. In earlier days of this country there were fond hopes that the
bail provision was unnecessary, that no branch of our Government would ever want
to deprive any person of bail. On this subject Mr. Justice Story said, 'The provision
would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is scarcely possible
that any department of such a government should authorize or justify such atrocious
conduct.' Story on Constitutional Law, 5th ed., Vol. 2, p. 650. Perhaps the word
'atrocious' is too strong. I can only say that I regret, deeply regret, that the Court now
adds the right to bail to the list of other Bill of Rights guarantees that have recently
been weakened to expand governmental powers at the expense of individual freedom."
342 U.S. 524, 556-58. Cases in agreement with Jdstice Black's interpretation are:
United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1926) ; Trimble v. Stone, 187 F.
Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Fiala, 102 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Wash.
1951).
100 See testimony of Senator Tydings, Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 81-83.
101 See testimony of Professor Foote, Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 354.
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during the first week of August. The folders on his desk were of men
arrested almost indiscriminately for serious and not serious crimes, the
arrests having taken place the latter part of March and the first two
weeks of April. These folders were on his desk as the first part of a
stage of determination of whether to proceed with criminal prosecution,
and all this time the men were languishing in the Roman jails. The
leisurely pace was accentuated by the fact that most cases took a full
year to go through the period of preliminary investigation. He had
some cases on his desk that went back 9 and 10 years where the man
had been in preventive detention for that period of time awaiting the
decision of the [Magistrate] and the prosecutor as to whether to pro-
ceed with formal prosecution.
10 2
Foote noted that similar situations existed in Holland and
Belgium, and he cited a letter from a West German lawyer who
wrote that a waiting term of 5 years was not unusual in big cases
and claimed that his country held the world's record of 7 years.
Foote corrected him, however, observing that he had personally seen
a case in Rome where the period of waiting was 9 years.
In conclusion Professor Foote stated: It seems to me perfectly clear
that it is precisely the kind of abuse found today in continental
Europe which the English Petition of Right of 1628 was designed to
avoid by bringing the Magna Carta to bear upon the principle of pre-
trial detention. It was precisely the kind of abuse which prevails in
continental Europe today that our colonial practices and constitutional




The second constitutional impediment regarding preventive de-
tention is that of due process. There are three basic objections on
this ground: (1) that pretrial detention punishes a defendant before
he is tried, thus violating the principle that an accused is presumed
to be innocent; (2) that it creates a substantial handicap to the
accused's ability to prepare his defense; and (3) that strong em-
pirical evidence exists to. demonstrate that pretrial detention has a
substantially adverse effect on the final disposition of a defendant's
case. The first two grounds have been traditionally cited by pre-
ventive detention opponents. More recently, the latter ground has
been added after being initially articulated by Professor Foote. 4
The authority most often cited for the first two due process
grounds is Stack v. Boyle,10 5 which held that bail in an amount
greater than necessary to assure a defendant's appearance was
excessive under the eighth amendment. In the Court's opinion, Chief
Justice Vinson wrote:
102 Id. at 354-55.
103 Id.
104 See Foote, The C6ming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1I, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
1125, 1148-51 (1965).
105 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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The traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the un-
hampered preparation of a defense and serves to prevent the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction . . . .Unless this right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after cen-
turies of struggle, would lose its meaning.'0 6
In response, the proponents of preventive detention argue that
the presumption of innocence is not a valid objection because it is
merely "a procedural rule of evidence which operates only at trial,
placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution."' 0' They also
point out that the presumption of innocence does not arise during
the pretrial process of the case when the defendant can be arrested
and indicted merely on probable cause to believe him guilty.
In opposition to this view, former Attorney General Ramsay
Clark has stated:
The thing we're talking about is holding people who we say we presume
innocent. If I had to look for all the causes of turbulence in our time,
and particularly among our young people-I would put as one of the
three greatest, our failure to insist upon human dignity. I think you can
find that as an underlying cause of a great part of all the wildness of
our times.
The presumption of innocence is basic to one philosophy of life, and
it says essentially that the individual counts for something-that we
really do believe in him-that he matters and that when he is in a con-
test with the state (which will never be equal)-we presume he is inno-
cent, until by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, he is convicted.
If that sounds pretty far out, compare that with the statement of
the spokesman for the Administration-the Assistant Attorney General
for the Criminal Division at the American Bar Association meeting in
August, when he said, "the presumption of innocence is a mere rule of
procedural evidence." I'm not sure what mere rules of procedural ev-
idence are-I didn't bother to ask him. But to call the presumption of
innocence a mere rule of procedural evidence, to me, really misses the
issue.' 08
Preventive detention advocates contend that there is ample
precedent for detentions involving capital punishment cases or when
a defendant is incompetent and unable to stand trial. The question,
however, is whether this should be expanded to include detention
to protect against the danger of future crimes or of interference
with witnesses. Such detention has often been opposed by the fre-
quently cited dictum of Mr. Justice Jackson in Williamson v.
106 Id. at 4.
107 Address by Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, on Preventive Detention
before ABA, Dallas, Texas, Aug. 12, 1969. See also NATIONAL BAIL CONFERENCE, supra
note 24, at 177.
108 Remarks of Mr. Ramsay Clark on Preventive Detention at 1969 convention
of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, New York City, Oct. 29, 1969.
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United States109 that such imprisonment is "unprecedented" and
"fraught with danger of excesses and injustice ......
Opposed to this, however, are the more recent statements of
former Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. In Carbo v.
United States,"' Justice Douglas stated in dictum that the denial of
bail on appeal would be justified if the safety of the community
would be jeopardized."' A similar view was expressed by former
Chief Justice Warren in Leigh v. United States." 2 These cases,
however, may be distinguished from the pretrial detention situation
on the ground that they involved defendants on appeal who had
been tried and found guilty, thus removing the presumption of in-
nocence. Likewise, detentions involving capital cases have been
distinguished on the basis of tradition, while sexual psychopath
and mental illness detentions have been distinguished on the ground
that, because of the mental or emotional abnormality of persons
subjected to those proceedings, such persons are not responsive to
the deterrents provided by criminal sanctions and, therefore, cannot
be dealt with through the usual processes of the criminal law." 3
In regard to the due process objection, based on the impairment
of a defendant's ability to assist in the preparation of his defense,
the Administration's bill seeks to overcome this by allowing release
"for good cause shown" into the custody of the United States
Marshal or "other appropriate person" for limited periods in
order to prepare defenses." 4
While this provision seems to answer the problem, yet a de-
fendant's ability to aid his defense might remain hampered in two
significant ways. First, it would be necessary to disclose an intended
defense in the course of establishing the "good cause" necessary
to obtain a defendant's release. This could easily provide the prose-
cution with information leading to incriminating evidence which
could be used against the defendant. Thus, serious fifth amendment
problems could arise." 5
The other potential problem with the Administration's proposal
for releasing the defendant to assist in preparing his defense relates
109 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950). See text at note 9, supra.
11o 369 U.S. 868 (1962).
Ill He repeated this observation in Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8 (1964).
112 82 S. Ct. 994, 996 (1962).
113 See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. Rxv. 1475, 1504
(1966).
114 Adm. Bill, supra note 3.
15 Cantillon v. Supreme Court, No. 69-1186-FW (U.S. Dist. Ct., Central Dist.
of Calif., Sept. 11, 1969), declaring pretrial prosecution discovery of alibi witnesses
to be a violation of the right against self-incrimination.
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to the circumstance of a defendant being in police custody during
this effort. Many criminal cases, especially in large urban areas,
involve minority, ghetto residents and witnesses from the same
racial or class sub-culture. In these cases, the accused very often
is the only one who can locate and induce reluctant witnesses to
come forward. 16 The ability of a minority defendant to do so when
accompanied by a police officer (usually considered persona non
grata in ghetto areas) may be virtually impossible.
Due process implications also arise with respect to the proven
prejudicial effect of pretrial detention upon final disposition of cases.
The leading exponent of this theory has been Professor Caleb
Foote."7 Based upon a study made by Professor Rankin of New
York University Law School in 1964,118 Professor Foote contends
that empirical data shows that "pretrial detention has a direct ad-
verse effect on the disposition of the accused's case.""' 9
The Rankin study compared the dispositions of 374 defen-
dants on bail with 358 in pretrial custody. It was found that
only 17 percent of the out-of-custody defendants received prison
sentences whereas 64 percent of those in custody received such
sentences. Forty-seven percent of the bailed defendants were ac-
quitted compared to only 27 percent of those who were detained.
Thirty-six percent of the bailed defendants were convicted without
receiving a prison sentence, whereas only 9 percent of the jailed de-
fendants avoided such a sentence after conviction.
The Rankin study is particularly significant because it went
beyond what other researchers had done 120 by controlling the more
obvious variables that might explain the more frequent unfavorable
dispositions for those detained. These factors included previous
criminal record, the amount of bail set, and whether or not the de-
fendant was represented by appointed counsel. It was found that
each of these factors was significantly related both to detention and
to the likelihood of a prison sentence. Thus, it was a definite pos-
sibility that detained defendants more often received prison sen-
116 See Attorney General's Commission on Poverty and the Administration of
Federal Criminal Justice, Report 26 (1963) ; Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis
in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125, 1141 (1965).
117 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 11, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125,
1146 (1965).
118 Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 641 (1964).
119 Foote, supra note 117, at 1151.
120 Other surveys are reported in Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court:
Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1054 (1954); Note,




tences than those who are free because more of the former have
previous records.
In order to assess the effect of the detention factor, Professor
Rankin separated the defendants into two groups, that is, those with
records and those without. When this was done, it was found that
among the group with no previous record, 59 percent of the defen-
dants who were in custody received prison sentences compared to
only 10 percent of the defendants on bail. Of the group of defen-
dants with prior records, 81 percent of those who were jailed prior
to trial were ultimately sentenced to prison, compared to only 36
percent of the defendants on bail. Thus, jailed defendants in each
category were 49 percent and 45 percent, respectively, more likely
to be sentenced to prison. These percentages were equivalent to the
47 percent difference existing when the previous record factor was
not controlled.' 2 '
Similar findings were obtained when bail amount and type of
counsel were separately controlled, with only a slight reduction
when all three factors were held constant. Thus, Rankin's study
presents strong evidence of a causal relation between detention and
disposition.
Professor Foote has articulated some of the reasons for the
detrimental effect of pretrial detention. Among the obvious factors
is the loss of employment which affects obtaining probation, earn-
ing a lawyer's fee so that one may choose his own lawyer, and sup-
porting one's family. Other more subtle aspects include: (1) the
effect of the bias of those involved in administering the criminal
justice process (police, jailers, prosecution and defense counsel,
judges, and probation officers) in pre-judging the jailed defendant
as a failure and thus coloring their actual disposition;'
22 (2) the
effect of a defendant sharing the idea that he is a failure, thereby
reducing the chance of his being able to complete a period of pro-
bation successfully; (3) the quality of legal representation received
by the jailed defendant in regard to the adverse physical situation
surrounding the interview process whereby the defendant must be
seen under conditions lacking privacy and mutual dignity, com-
pared to the situation of the defendant who is out of custody and is
able to consult his attorney in the lawyer's office;"'
2 (4) the adverse
121 Rankin, supra note 118, at 647-48.
122 Foote, supra note 117, at 1147. Professor Foote cites as an example a proba-
tion officer assigned to writing up a report on a jail case having a bias before he
starts due to the defendant's jail status. Thus, he suggests that the statistics showing
the unfavorable dispositions received by jailed defendants may in fact be "nothing
more than the operation of a self-fulfilling prophecy."
123 Id. As Professor Foote points out, the frequency of pretrial consultation may
[Vol. 10
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
effect of detention on the quality of the lawyer-client relationship
resulting from the belief of an in-custody defendant that he is
getting less adequate representation;"' and (5) that the defendant's
prospect for rehabilitation is adversely influenced by his negative
attitude toward the fairness of the system as affected by his ex-
perience in detention.'25
For these reasons, the opponents contend that pretrial deten-
tion adversely affects the disposition of a defendant's case and,
in turn, is contrary to due process.
2. Practical Considerations: The Problem of Prediction and
the Burden on an Already Overburdened Judicial System. The dif-
ficulty of prediction and the burden on the courts in administering a
system of preventive detention are the two major practical objec-
tions which have been raised by the opposition.
With regard to the problem of prediction, recent statistics
show that out of 2,557 persons indicted in the District of Columbia
on felony charges during 1968, 153 were on bail at the time, or 6
percent of the total indicted. 2 The District of Columbia Crime
Commission did a survey over a two-and-one-half-year period which
showed that 207 persons out of 2,776 cases were charged with com-
mitting new felonies while awaiting trial on another. An analysis
of the recidivist defendants showed no discernible pattern on which
a judge could have relied in determining whom to release.'27 For
example, the Commission's study showed that among the eleven
be significantly reduced by the fact of the geographic remoteness of the lawyer's
office to the jail and the burden on the lawyer, intensifying the latter's concern and
resentment over the "low work to fee ratio of much criminal representation."
124 Id., n.247. In this regard Professor Foote describes a phenomenon which has
been frequently observed by this writer. Despite the generally recognized high-quality
representation provided by the defender's office of this county, defendants who are in
custody sometimes express resentment over the fact that they must rely upon the
public defender. Professor Foote attributes this to the "jailhouse consultations" which
intensify a defendant's "disassociation with counsel" and confirm the suspicion that he
is being given second-class legal services because of his indigence; this, in turn, induces
resentment at being treated as a "charity case," confirming the belief that the adver-
sary system is not truly adversary when one must rely upon a state supplied public
defender whose career involves the representation of jailhouse failures.
Professor Foote also relates an experience he frequently observed when private
lawyers interviewing newly admitted prisoners in a detention jail would ask each one:
"How much money do you have or can you raise?" Foote reports that "the interview
was terminated immediately if the answer was unsatisfactory. These rejected prisoners
were later represented by the public defender and probably received better legal ser-
vices than would have been provided by the private lawyers, who had reputations as
fixers and as being legally incompetent. But the psychological undertones of such
transactions are obvious and must impair the defendant's opinion of the fairness of the
trial process."
125 Id. at 1147.
126 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 689.
127 Id. at 132: Testimony of Mrs. Patricia M. Wald, Attorney Member, Judicial
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offenders charged with murder while on bond, four had no prior
convictions. Another four had only a misdemeanor conviction, and
three had but a single felony conviction each. Of the group which
had committed rapes or attempted rapes on bail, there was not a
single prior felony conviction. Of the persons who had committed
robberies on bail, 48 percent had no prior record; while 40 percent
had one prior felony conviction, and only 12 percent had more than
one.
128
The dearth of knowledge with respect to predictability has
been described by Professor Foote as follows:
We know almost nothing in criminology about the factors that dis-
tinguish those few accused robbers or rapists who will commit a crime
on pretrial liberty from the majority of the accused robbers and rapists
who will not commit such a crime on pretrial liberty. To imagine that,
at a preliminary hearing soon after arrest, a judge could make a reliable
determination about an accused's future dangerousness when very little
data about the accused will then be available to him, and we do not
know what that little data means anyway, it seems to me is to indulge
in pure fantasy.12
9
Professor Dershowitz has described the problem as follows:
Predictions of human conduct are generally difficult to make, and this
should not be surprising, for man is complex, and the world he inhabits
is full of unexpected occurrences. Predictions of rare human events are
even more difficult. And predictions that a rare human event will occur
within a short span of time are the most difficult of all. Acts of violence
committed by persons released pending trial are rare events, and the
relevant time span is relatively short. Accordingly, the kind of predic-
tions under consideration here begin with heavy odds against their
accuracy. 130
The ability of judges to predict the potential of a defendant to
commit a crime while out on bail was the subject of a short test
Council Committee to Study the Bail Reform Act and Member of the President's
Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia.
128 Id. at 133. In a statement submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Rights, Chief Judge Harold H. Greene, -District of Columbia Court of
General Sessions, cited the statistics gathered by the D.C. Crime 'Commission showing
that 124 (or 4.5 percent) of 2,776 cases involved a crime of actual or potential violence.
These figures referred only to charges and not convictions; the conviction rate was
approximately 75 percent so that, as Judge Greene pointed out, "only about 3 percent
of all those released on bail during the survey period were found to have committed a
violent crime while out on bail." Id. at 35. He also cited figures showing that in 1967,
190 defendants indicted for robbery were released, and of these, 22, or 11.6 percent,
were subsequently indicted for another felony while out on bail. Thus, he observed
that 8 persons would have to be detained in order to keep one defendant off the street
who might commit another offense while out on bail.
129 Id. at 352.
180 Id. at 173. See also discussion in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 68-69.
[Vol. 10
PREVENTIVE DETENTION
conducted by the Bail Agency of the District of Columbia in 1968.''
During a period of several months, the Agency made a follow-up
study of defendants who appeared before two judges. One of the
judges was known to follow the Bail Reform Act rather explicitly
and was lenient in his release policy. The other judge, who claimed
that he had the ability to choose between the "bad eggs and the
good eggs," had a stricter policy. It was found that of 285 defen-
dants who appeared before the judge who claimed that he was able
to predict recidivism, he ascertained 144 bad risks. These were
detained by high money bond whereas the 141 good risks were
released. The other judge found 46 bad risks out of a total of 226.
Thus the lenient judge had released 79 percent whereas the tough
judge had released less than 50 percent. Of the 180 persons released
by the lenient judge there were 16 offenses committed while on
bail, whereas there were 12 bail offenders among the 141 good risks
who were released by the tough judge. The recidivist rate was 8
percent for the judge who claimed that he had the ability to spot a
bad risk, and 9 percent for the judge who released practically every-
one-a difference of only 1 percent. It was also interesting to note
that out of the 144 bad risks detained by the tough judge, 36 had
their cases dismissed before trial, whereas another large percentage
was acquitted, and of those convicted very few received time in
jail. 132
Opponents also contend that actual experience with preventive
detention has shown the difficulty of predicting future conduct. One
area in which such experience has occurred is that of juvenile court
proceedings. Most jurisdictions authorize judges to detain children
for the best interest of the community to prevent danger as well as
flight. In most places, detention facilities for such children are
greatly overcrowded. Nevertheless, recidivism among juveniles re-
leased pending trial in the District of Columbia has been approx-
imately 11 percent (2 percent to 4 percent higher than that for
the District Court rate of recidivism). 13
Another example of the difficulty of predicting recidivism has
been manifested in the experience with persons released pending
appeal. Under the Bail Reform Act a defendant may be detained if
the court believes that release would present a danger to the com-
munity. Despite this, however, the rate of recidivism for persons
released pending appeal has been reported at 16 percent, compared
to 8 percent or 9 percent for those on pretrial release.'
1'1 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 182: Statement by Paul L. Woodard, Chief
Counsel, Senate Subcommitte on Constitutional Rights.
132 Id.




Critics also cite the field of mental illness as another example
of the poor ability to predict future conduct.' 35 It has long been
assumed that psychiatrists are accurate in their predictions about
patients who are diagnosed as dangerous and likely to cause serious
harm if not confined. Unfortunately, this has not been systematic-
ally tested. Patients who are considered dangerous are confined;
and thus there is no opportunity to demonstrate what they would
have done had they been released. While erroneous predictions of
violence are never learned, the doctor will almost certainly be told
about mistakes in predicting non-violence-mainly from reading
about them in the newspapers. Mistakes in underestimating the
prospect of violence are highly visible compared to the relative
invisibility of errors in overestimating such violence. Thus, as
Professor Dershowitz has pointed out, the doctor's "modus oper-
andi becomes: when in doubt, don't let him out."'36
The accuracy of these psychiatric predictions was put to an
inadvertent test when a Supreme Court decision in 1966 resulted in
the release of numerous mentally ill persons who had been diag-
nosed as dangerous."' At the time, considerable fear for the com-
munity's safety was expressed, but studies made of these patients
after they were released showed that the predictions of violence
were greatly exaggerated. Similar studies in Baltimore also corrob-
orate this conclusion.13
8
Another practical objection made by critics of preventive de-
tention is that of the effect that the administration of its procedures
is expected to have in taxing an already overburdened court struc-
ture. This objection was recently made by veteran District Attor-
ney Frank S. Hogan of New York City, who opposed a preventive
detention proposal which was under study by the New York State
Penal Law Revision Commission.'39 The proposal was withdrawn
after Mr. Hogan's argument that "passage of the new section would
smother the courts in a blizzard of hearings that were not required
under existing procedures."' 40
A similar view was expressed by the American Bar Association's
Advisory Committee on Pretrial Release, which pointed out that the
judicial mechanism for operating a system of preventive detention
would require considerable improvement over what is now available,
135 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 10, at 22.
136 Id. at 26.
137 Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
138 RAPPEPORT, THE CLINICAL EVALUATION Or THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL (1968).




and that to do so would "add greater burdens to an already strained
judicial system.' a41
In this regard, a serious question arises whether preventive
detention will merely compound the problems of an overburdened
criminal justice system in the large urban areas. For example, it has
been pointed out that in October of 1968 the average time between
indictment and final disposition of cases in the District of Colum-
bia District Court was seven-and-one-half months, with some cases
dragging on for as long as one or two years.' 42 Adding the burden of
a preventive detention procedure upon this already overburdened
court system without increasing judicial and legal manpower would
be impossible. 4 ' The ameliorative effect which an increase in court
and legal staffing might have upon the incidence of recidivism while
on bail would most certainly be impaired by the absorbtion of such
additional manpower in the task of administering a preventive de-
tention system.
3. The Need. In addition to the other aspects of the problem,
there is much disagreement over the necessity of preventive deten-
tion. A "war" of statistics based upon various studies has gone on.
Each side has its own study and statistical base to support its argu-
ment, all of which presents a very confusing picture to the observer.
An administration spokesman, Assistant United States At-
torney General Will Wilson, has referred to one study showing a
10 percent recidivist rate in the District of Columbia as compared
to other studies showing a 7 percent rate. He has also cited a recid-
ivist figure of 60 percent for persons released on bail on robbery
charges, a study by the Metropolitan Police Department during
141 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 69.
142 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 12: Testimony of Hon. Geo. L. Hart, Jr.,
Judge of the District Court and Chairman of the Judicial Council 'Committee on the
Bail Reform Act. Judge Hart stressed the need for more judicial and legal manpower,
including a well-staffed public defender office, to decrease the number of frivolous
motions and improve the quality and speed of trials. Id. at 10-11, 20. His opinion
was that if criminal cases could be tried within six weeks to two months there would
be no need to amend the Bail Reform Act to provide for preventive detention.
The experience in Santa Clara County provides an interesting comparison. A
survey of cases in September of 1969 showed that the average time between arraign-
ment in the Superior Court and final disposition in public defender cases was 42 days.
Private counsel cases averaged 65 days.
. 143 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 87. The problem of administration was
described by Senator Sam J. Ervin during the Senate Subcommittee hearings when
he remarked: "It seems to me that this would be a cumbersome thing from the
administrative standpoint, because there is nothing to prevent a lawyer from going
in there and presenting his full case on the hearing, saying, 'My client ought not to be
held at all. In fact he ought not to be even required to give bail because he is innocent.'
And he can contend for his innocence before the judge. Then he has another chance
to contend before the jury. It seems to me that it would be easier and more efficient
to try the case in the first instance on its merits within a short period of time."
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1967 indicating a 34.6 percent rate, and another one which re-
portedly showed a 70.1 percent rate."'
On the other hand, in testimony before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Constitutional Rights, Chief Judge Harold H. Greene of the
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions relied upon the
District of Columbia Crime Commission Report of 1966 showing a
general recidivist rate of 7.5 percent and a 4.5 percent rate for
crimes of actual or potential violence. He also cited a study of rob-
bery defendants who had been released on bail showing that 11.6
percent were subsequently indicted for another felony. 45
In her opposition to preventive detention, Mrs. Patricia M.
Wald, Washington, D.C., attorney and member of the Judicial
Council Committee to Study the Bail Reform Act, has relied upon
1968 statistics from the District of Columbia which showed a 6
percent rate of recidivism among those already on bail for prior
offense compared to an 8 percent figure in 1967.146 Referring to
other data gathered by the, Judicial Council Committee (Hart Com-
mittee) she also made the statement that: "Although robbery is the
most frequent new crime committed by offenders while on pretrial
bail, 88 percent of all robbers indicted do not commit a new crime
on bail. Nor do 93 percent of housebreakers, 84 percent of nar-
cotics violators, and 84 percent of auto thieves." 47
Aside from the question of numbers, a further issue is whether
preventive detention will accomplish what its advocates promise,
that is, a significant reduction of crime. In this regard, one writer
has expressed serious doubt on the basis that preventive detention
would merely keep persons in custody who would have been detained
in any event by judges purposely setting high bail.148 Another neg-
ative indicator is the existing experience with preventive detention
in the juvenile court and on releases pending appeal. As noted by the
opponents, there has been an 11 percent recidivist rate in the
Juvenile Court in the District of Columbia and a 16 percent rate
among defendants released pending appeal.
49
144 Address by Will Wilson, supra note 107, at 4-5.
145 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 35.
146 Id. at 144.
147 Id. at 139. In light of this conflict of statistics, one can readily agree with
Mrs. Wald's statement before the subcommittee that, "One of the most discouraging
aspects of the debate on preventive detention is the lack of adequate data on bail
violators." She went on to suggest that the committee could make a great contribution
to solving this problem of inadequate data by a systematic gathering of the necessary
information.
148 A. Goldstein, Jail Before Trial, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 1969, at 15.
149 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 139.
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A dim view of the prospects for the success of preventive de-
tention is reflected in Professor Foote's criticism that it is "essen-
tially a gimmick" which seeks to improve the administration of
criminal justice without any cost to the public as an alternative to
spending more money for more efficient procedures in adminis-
tration. 5o
The gloomiest forecast of all has been expressed by Professor
Goldstein, who wrote:
Perhaps the most important point to be made against the proposal is
that the principle of pretrial preventive detention, once legitimated, is
likely to develop a life of its own. More and more crimes will be re-
garded as sufficiently threatening to warrant detention before trial. This
will do irreparable harm to the presumption of innocence and to the
more concrete interests described earlier. It will, in addition, add mate-
rially to already clogged court calendars and an overburdened judicial
system as new procedures are created to determine the issue of prob-
able danger and new provisions for appellate review are devised to
make preventive detention more palatable. Over time, the result may
well be more trial delays, more extended pretrial detention, and, even-
tually, as some of the proposals contemplate, a requirement of release
if the trial is not held within the stated period of time. This may lead,
in turn, to a condition I have observed in at least one Latin American
country: trials rarely held and preventive detention an entire substitute
for post-conviction imprisonment.
The criminal law has always had to take into account that the restric-
tions we place on state power may cost us some measure of protection
from danger. In the effort to avoid all danger, the proponents of pre-
ventive detention exaggerate what can be predicted about criminality
to justify an indiscriminate practice of imprisoning persons whose guilt
remains to be proved. Such a course would sacrifice too casually the
liberty of too many people for a negligible increase in public safety.
Worse, it may delude us into thinking something substantial is being
done to reduce crime. 151
CONCLUSION
In this discussion we have attempted to review the background
and the various facets of the current controversy on preventive
detention. The problem presents itself as the logical culmination of
the movement to eliminate money bail. The inequities of the money
bail system have been adequately documented by studies beginning
in 1927 and more intensively during the decade of the fifties. These
studies culminated in the Manhattan Bail Projects and in other
efforts leading to greater reliance upon release without money bail.
The experience and success of those efforts were reviewed and dis-
150 Id. at 362.
151 A. Goldstein, supra note 148, at 17-18.
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seminated at the National Bail Conference of 1964 and led to the
enactment of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966.
During the intervening period since the Bail Reform Act, there
has been a dramatic rise in the crime rate throughout the United
States in general and in Washington, D.C., in particular. Since the
courts in the District of Columbia handle more criminal cases than
any other federal jurisdiction, the Bail Reform Act has been applied
there more frequently. That increased crime rate has involved a
substantial number of recidivists, particularly in Washington, D.C.'52
National concern over this deteriorating crime situation in-
spired a presidential campaign on a theme of "law and order." Soon
after taking office, the new Administration offered preventive de-
tention as a concrete proposal aimed at improving the crime situ-
ation. Preventive detention was also the logical effect of the move-
ment to eliminate money bail, which necessarily brings out into
the open the practice of many judges in using high bail to detain
persons considered dangerous.
In addition to the constitutional issues, that is, whether the
eighth amendment precludes preventive detention, and whether
such detention violates due process in controverting the presumption
of innocence and inhibiting a defendant's ability to prepare his case,
other practical questions are raised concerning the problems of pre-
diction and the additional burden which would be imposed upon a
judicial system which is unable to keep up with its present work-
load. Serious questions also arise with respect to the actual need
for preventive detention, and whether it will have any real effect
on the crime problem.
In considering the various pros and cons, it would seem that
the critics, including the ABA Committee on Minimum Standards,
have the leading edge in suggesting that more data is required, more
quately supervised conditions of release, and in general, a beefing
vigorous efforts and experience in controlling the problem by ade-
up of the entire judicial system so as to afford speedier trials and
swift justice. Only after such alternative efforts have been tried
and accurate data obtained will it be possible to truly determine
whether the drastic procedure of pretrial preventive detention should
be formally engrafted into our system of criminal justice.
152 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 141. At the Senate Hearings it was re-
ported that 92 percent of the offenders charged in the District Court had a past
record, 45 percent had a record of violent crimes, 83 percent had some kind of con-
viction; and 65 percent had been in jail before.
